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Partnering to Make Peace: The Effectiveness of Joint African and non-
African Mediation Efforts1 
 
Introduction 
From Africa’s early post-colonial period onwards, a strong preference for African solutions 
to African conflicts has consistently been recognised in the African state system.2 Yet, 
paradoxically, African third parties have consistently and typically been referred to as 
ineffective in the academic literature. In the introduction to an edited volume on foreign 
involvement in civil wars in Africa, Smock and Gregorian argue that the US and the former 
colonial powers seem to have a better record of successful mediation than either the OAU or 
African leaders, and further claim that the “very significant role of the United States and the 
European states seems related to the assets, resources, and leverage available to these 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Alex de Waal, Neil MacFarlane, and Sophia Dawkins for providing excellent comments on an 
earlier version of this article. Any errors are my own. 
2 2 I. W. Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization 
21, no. 3 (1967); S. N. MacFarlane, "Intervention and Security in Africa," International Affairs 60, no. 1 (1983); 
W. J. Foltz, "The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa's Conflicts," in Conflict Resolution 
in Africa, ed. F. M. Deng and I. W. Zartman (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1991); P. D. Williams, 
"From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security 
Culture," African Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007): 261; S. A. Dersso, "The Quest for Pax Africana: The Case of the 
African Union's Peace and Security Regime," African Journal on Conflict Resolution 12, no. 2 (2012). 
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powers.”3 In his study on African mediation in Eastern African civil conflicts, Khadiagala 
makes the claim that proximity to the adversaries and deeper knowledge of the conflicts does 
not substitute for concrete diplomatic and political tools that make for effective mediation; 
and further argues that “by intervening with only limited tangible and material resources, 
African interveners have contributed to the widespread perception of being meddlers rather 
than mediators.”4 
The problem with these claims about the ineffectiveness of African third parties is 
that the claims are based on only a few cases or anecdotal evidence. Studies in which it is 
claimed that non-African mediation is more effective than African mediation do not provide 
any systematic evidence to support this claim. This is particularly problematic since the 
modal outcome of international mediation efforts is failure. Since mediation is far more likely 
to fail than to succeed, it is likely that only looking at a few cases leads to biased conclusions.  
 In addition to the need of a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of African and 
non-African third parties, it is important to examine how the involvement of African and non-
African third parties in mediation combine to affect outcomes. While one would expect 
African mediators to limit the involvement of non-African third parties in mediation 
processes in Africa – because of the strong preference for African solutions to African 
conflicts – in practice African and non-African third parties are frequently involved in joint 
mediation efforts. As early as 1967, Zartman put forward an explanation for this seemingly 
paradox: “Many of Africa’s foreign policy troubles are found in the dilemma posed by the 
two functions: The desire to solve problems, which often exceeds system capabilities and 
requires outside help, clashes with the desire to maintain the autonomy of the system.”5 In 
other words, African third parties sometimes have no other option than to accept non-African 
involvement in peace processes, because they lack the resources to successfully resolve the 
conflict by themselves. Zartman’s observation that African third parties often lack the 
material resources to effectively mediate is typical for the academic literature on conflict 
resolution in Africa.6  
                                                 
3 D.R. Smock and H. Gregorian, "Introduction," in Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in 
Africa (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 12. 
4 G. M. Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators? African Interveners in Civil Conflicts in Eastern Africa  (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 6. 
5 Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," 550. 
6 Smock and Gregorian, "Introduction; Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators? African Interveners in Civil 
Conflicts in Eastern Africa; D. S. Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for 
Cooperation  (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). 
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Contrary to much of the literature on peacemaking efforts in Africa, I argue that 
African third party involvement in peacemaking efforts is essential in order to resolve civil 
wars in Africa. While African third parties are indeed relatively weak in terms of the material 
resources they command, a crucial source of mediation success is usually overlooked when 
discussing the effectiveness of African third parties: third party legitimacy. This article shows 
that African third parties are effective in mediating civil wars in Africa because of a high 
degree of legitimacy flowing from the African solutions norm. This norm prescribes that 
mediation by African third parties in conflicts in Africa is more preferable than mediation by 
non-African third parties.  
I further argue that third party legitimacy and third party capacity supplement each 
other rather than supplant. For this reason, mixed mediation efforts – in which African and 
non-African third parties jointly mediate – are highly effective. African and non-African third 
parties have complementary strengths: while African third parties generally provide 
mediation efforts with a high degree of third party legitimacy, non-African third parties can 
provide material incentives to the conflict parties in order to move them towards making 
peace.  
I measure mediation success in this article by looking at whether a mediation effort 
leads to the conclusion of a peace agreement. The conclusion of a peace agreement is 
arguably the most common way of measuring mediation success, because it provides an 
objective benchmark that is clearly observable.7 Indeed, it is relatively easy for researchers to 
code the conclusion of a peace agreement, since they are often made publically available 
when the peace talks end. Even when peace agreements are not published, they usually attract 
much international attention.  
This article adds to the literature on both an empirical and theoretical level. Several 
studies have previously examined the effectiveness of different types of mediation, including 
whether the third parties are African or not.8 As observed by Franke and Esmenjaud, the 
concepts of African ownership and Africanization have a “virtual omnipresence throughout 
the proliferating literature on peace and security in Africa.”9 However, the effectiveness of 
African and non-African third parties has not yet been explicitly compared in a large-n study. 
                                                 
7 See:  
8 For instance, see: A. Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Khadiagala.A. Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 
9 B. Franke and R. Esmenjaud, "Who Owns African Ownership? The Africanisation of Security and Its Limits," 
South African Journal of International Affairs 15, no. 2 (2008): 137. 
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I present systematic evidence in this article that shows that African third parties outperform 
non-African third parties, but that mixed mediation efforts are the most effective. On a 
theoretical level, this article shows that the material resources of a third party are not the main 
determinant of mediation success. Many studies within the current international mediation 
literature are based on the idea that leverage in the form of economic and military resources is 
the ticket to mediation success.10 The findings in this article suggest that ideational factors – 
such as the norm of African solutions to African challenges – also have a strong impact on 
mediation success. 
 This article proceeds as follows. The first section briefly discusses the different 
comparative advents of African and non-African third parties. Next, I explain the 
methodology used to test the argument that African third party involvement is essential in 
order to resolve civil wars in Africa. The subsequent section provides the findings, after 
which the final section concludes. 
 
A Division of Labour: The Complimentary Strengths of African and Non-African Third 
Parties 
In one of the first comparative case studies on international conflict resolution in Africa, 
Zartman argues that a mediator needs to materially manipulate the conflict parties, through 
threats and inducements, in order to mediate effectively.11 From this perspective, mediation 
success is simply the product of the use of economic and military capabilities in order to 
move the conflict parties from fighting to negotiating an end to the conflict. I refer to this way 
of understanding mediation success as a capacity-based perspective. 
The vast majority of subsequent studies on mediation have followed this capacity-
based perspective. In one of the first quantitative studies on international mediation, 
Bercovitch argues and finds that the “possession of resources and an active strategy provide 
the basis for successful mediation.”12 In his comparative study of several ethnic conflicts in 
Africa, Rothchild argues how providing material incentives to conflict parties can move them 
towards compromise. This leads Rothchild to conclude that only mediators with “muscle” 
                                                 
10 A. Duursma, "A Current Literature Review of International Mediation," International Journal of Conflict 
Management 25, no. 1 (2014); J. M. Greig and P. F. Diehl, International Mediation, War and Conflict in the 
Modern World (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). 
11 I. W. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
12 J. Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement: Evaluating the Conditions for Successful 
Mediation," Negotiation Journal 7, no. 1 (1991): 28. 
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can move peace process ahead through “a combination of pressures, incentives, enforcement, 
and guarantees.”13 Based on the current literature, it is thus not surprising that in one of the 
most extensive literature reviews of international mediation to date, Greig and Diehl assert 
that mediation by a weak mediator is not effective as it is “limited in the resources that can be 
brought to bear in the talks as a means of pushing the parties to make concessions and 
leverage an agreement between the two sides.”14 A third party with a high degree of material 
resources can provide side payments or promise side payments to one or both of the conflict 
parties, which may induce them to make peace.15  Previous research has also found that a 
third party guaranteeing nondefection with agreements is a strong determinant of mediation 
success – and credibly guaranteeing non-defection requires military capacity.16 In summary, 
it follows from the capacity-based mechanisms of mediation success that the more economic 
and military resources a third party possesses, the more incentives the mediator can provide 
to the conflict parties in order to move them towards signing a peace agreement.  
 Based on the current mediation literature – and because of the resource constraints 
African third parties typically face – one would thus expect African third parties to be less 
effective than non-African third parties in mediating civil wars in Africa. Indeed, Rothchild 
argues that “African regional initiatives, based largely on states with limited economic 
resources, cannot be expected to achieve their conflict management objectives unassisted.”17 
Similarly, Jackson claims that African initiatives are likely to prove less strong in conflict 
containment and even weaker in conflict termination than peacemaking efforts undertaken by 
powerful mediators who can exercise leverage such as the US, the UN, or other key actors.18 
Yet, I argue that African third parties have a comparative advantage in what I label 
legitimacy-based mediation when mediating civil wars in Africa. In contrast to capacity-
based mediation, which is based on providing material incentives to make peace, legitimacy-
based mediation denotes power being conferred by the adversaries upon the mediator based 
on a normative belief by the adversaries that complying with the mediator is the right thing to 
do. Although third party legitimacy has received little attention, the idea that the success of 
third parties is also based on ideational sources of social control is not new. As early as 1967, 
                                                 
13 Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, 249. 
14 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 71. 
15 Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, 99-100. 
16 B. F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997). 
17 Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, 279. 
18 R. Jackson, "The Dangers of Regionalising International Conflict Management: The African Experience," 
Political Science 52, no. 1 (2000): 59. 
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Young described both tangible and intangible characteristics of a third party that he deemed 
necessary for effective intervention in international crises.19 Aall has asserted that the 
legitimate power of a mediator arises “from the parties’ perception that the mediator has the 
right to act as a third party and to ask for changes in behaviour or compliance”20 
 The legitimacy of African third parties is rooted within Africa’s normative 
environment, which is characterised by strong a commitment to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of African states, as well as a strong inclination towards non-alignment and anti-
colonialism. Clapham catches the essence of Africa’s normative environment when he argues 
that “the African state [as it emerged in the early post-colonial era] was the expression of an 
African identity and autonomy which were to be cherished and defended, against the attacks 
especially of the forces associated with Western imperialism.”21 Resolving conflicts in Africa 
without the involvement of non-African third parties is often perceived by African leaders as 
maintaining African autonomy. Indeed, commenting on the Algerian-Moroccan border 
dispute of 1963, Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie stated in his opening speech at the first 
extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, held in Addis Ababa from 15 
to 18 November 1963, that “Any misunderstandings which arise among brotherly members 
of this organization must be essentially considered a family affair in which no foreign hand 
can be allowed to play any role whatsoever.”22 That Selassie’s sentiment was shared by most 
other African leaders is reflected in the resolution adopted by this meeting, which considered 
“the imperative need of settling all differences between African states by peaceful means and 
within a strictly African framework.”23 
I argue that the African solutions norm results in a normative pull towards compliance 
with African third parties. Franck points out that an actor or rule that is perceived as 
legitimate “exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those 
                                                 
19 O. R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1967), 80-91. 
20 P. Aall, "The Power of Nonofficial Actors in Conflict Management," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of 
and Responses to International Conflict, ed. C. A. Crocker, Hampson F. O., and P. R. Aall (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 481. 
21 C. S. Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 246. 
22 Z. Červenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the Organisation of African Unity  (London: J. 
Friedman, 1977), 66, endnote 6. 
23 Organisation of African Unity, "Resolution Adopted at the First Extra-Ordinary Session of the Council of 
Ministers Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 to 18 November 1963, Ecm/Res. I (I)." An ad hoc 
commission was formed, since the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation & Arbitration provided for in Article 
I9 of the OAU Charter had not yet been set up. I. M. Wallerstein, "The Early Years of the Organization of 
African Unity: The Search for Organizational Preeminence," International Organization 20, no. 4 (1966): 781. 
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addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance 
with generally accepted principles of right process.”24 In the context of African civil wars, 
Červenka noted already in 1977 that the search for compromises is “regarded as a moral 
obligation on the conflicting parties to settle their dispute in the interests of African unity.”25 
Similarly, Gomes argues that the conflict resolution efforts of African third parties rely 
heavily on moral persuasion predicated on similar values.26  
An example of the pull towards compliance mechanism can be found in the Kenyan 
post-2007 election crisis. At the tenth ordinary summit of the AU, the Chair of the AU 
Commission and former President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, stressed the importance of 
finding a diplomatic way out of the crisis by stating that “Kenya is a country that was a hope 
for the continent. If Kenya burns there will be nothing for tomorrow. We cannot sit with our 
hands folded.”27 Moreover, when Graça Machel arrived in Nairobi to mediate Kenya’s Post-
2007 Electoral Crisis as part of Kofi Anan’s mediation team and told the conflict parties that 
her husband, Nelson Mandela, sent his best wishes and sought to remind them that all of 
Africa was watching the process.28 Almost one month later the conflict parties signed an 
agreement, which had been mediated by Kofi Annan in his capacity as the leader of the AU 
Panel of Eminent African Personalities. This agreement would lay the basis for a Grand 
Coalition Government that successfully mitigated the conflict. In order to reach this 
agreement, Annan did not use any coercion or inducements. As observed by Beardsley, 
“Annan possessed no authority to promise aid or threaten sanctions against the intransigent 
parties, nor did he have better access to information about the capabilities and resolve of the 
respective parties than they had themselves.”29 Instead, Anan relied on the legitimacy of the 
AU, which allowed the mediation team pull the conflict parties towards formulating a way 
out of the conflict.30  
I argue that the legitimacy of African third parties makes African third parties more 
effective than non-African third parties. The reason why legitimacy, far more than capacity, 
determines mediation success is that if a mediator has legitimacy, it can pull the conflict 
                                                 
24 T. M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 24. 
25 Červenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the Organisation of African Unity, 65.  
26 S. Gomes, "The Peacemaking Role of the Oau and the Au: A Comparative Analysis," in The African Union 
and Its Institutions, ed. J. Akokpari, A. Ndinga-Muvumba, and T. Murithi (Sunnyside: Fanele, 2008), 120. 
27 M. K. Juma, "African Mediation of the Kenyan Post-2007 Election Crisis," Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 27, no. 3 (2009): 408. 
28 R. Cohen, "How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya," New York Review of Books 55, no. 13 (2008): 5. 
29 K. Beardsley, "Intervention without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators," International 
Interactions 35, no. 3 (2009): 273. 
30 Juma, "African Mediation of the Kenyan Post-2007 Election Crisis," 408. 
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parties towards compliance, but if a mediator loses its legitimacy, material resources will 
rarely prove sufficient in mediating the conflict. In short, mediation by African third parties is 
more likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement than mediation by non-African 
third parties. 
Furthermore, the comparative advantage of African third parties in legitimacy-based 
mediation and non-African third parties in capacity-based mediation supplement each other. 
Hence, while I expect African third parties to outperform non-African third parties, I expect 
that mixed mediation efforts in which both types of third parties cooperate are the most 
effective type of mediation. The Naivasha peace process that led to the conclusion of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A 
illustrates how the comparative advantages of African third parties and the comparative 
advantage of non-African third-parties can supplement each other. The US applied crucial 
pressure on the conflict parties on several occasions and held out the promise to normalise 
relations with Sudan, while Norway and the EU shouldered the financial burden of the 
mediation process. Yet, the pressure from the non-African third parties only had effect 
because a mutually acceptable solution to the civil war had already been reached at Machakos 
on 20 July 2002. This solution was the product of a problem-solving process led by a highly 
committed IGAD, which enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy. The US Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, Charles Snyder, noted in this regard that “one of the keys to success 
in Sudan is actually falling in behind the work already done by the Africans, reinvigorating it, 
and taking it further.”31  
 In short, I argue that African third parties outperform non-African third parties, but 
that the most effective type of mediation efforts are peacemaking efforts in which African 
and non-African third parties cooperate to make peace. 
 
Cultural Similarly  
Before testing the central argument put forward in this article, I briefly discuss alternative 
arguments for why African third parties may be more effective at mediating African conflicts 
than non-African third parties. The first relates to the influence of culture on mediation 
processes, the second to the issue of biased mediation, and the third to the ineffectiveness of 
                                                 
31 D. Rothchild, "Conditions for Mediation Success: Evaluating Us Initiatives in Sudan and Liberia," in Conflict 
Management and African Politics: Ripeness, Bargaining, and Mediation, ed. T. Lyons and G. M. Khadiagala 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 101. 
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the UN. With regard to the role of culture, it might be the case that the African identity of the 
chief mediator rather than the legitimacy of the third party that mandates the mediator 
explains mediation success. Several studies have found that cultural similarities between the 
mediator and the disputants have a positive impact on mediation success.32 These studies 
typically highlight that a mediator that shares a similar culture with the disputants 
understands the complex social, political, and economic dynamics that underlie armed 
conflicts. This greater understanding allows the mediator to more effectively resolve the 
conflict. While it is acknowledged that African third parties are more likely to be similar to 
African conflict parties in terms of language, religion, and race than non-African third parties, 
making it necessary to control for these variables in the empirical analyses, a high degree of 
cultural variation nevertheless exist in Africa, both between countries and within countries.33 
I therefore argue that culture similarities alone cannot explain why African third parties are 
more effective than non-African third parties.  
 
Biased Mediation 
Since conflicts in Africa have strong regional dimensions, it is reasonable to surmise that 
African third parties are more likely to be biased when mediating in civil wars in Africa. 
African states have frequently openly supported incumbent governments or provided covert 
support to rebel parties prior or simultaneously to their mediation attempt. There is a 
substantial literature in which it is argued that biased mediation is more effective than 
unbiased mediation.34 Following these studies in favour of biased mediation, the higher 
likelihood of African third parties of being biased might, in turn, be the reason why African 
third parties are more effective than non-African third parties.  
  However, I argue that biased African third parties are ineffective. Biased African third 
parties are less likely to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, which significantly undermines 
the prospects for African mediation success. In the statiscal analysis, I will empirically assess 
to what extent biased mediation influences African mediation.  
                                                 
32J. Bercovitch and O. Elgström, "Culture and International Mediation: Exploring Theoretical and Empirical 
Linkages," International Negotiation 6, no. 1 (2001); P. J. Carnevale and D. W. Choi, "Culture in the Mediation 
of International Disputes," International Journal of Psychology 35, no. 2 (2000).   
33 A. A. Mazrui, "On the Concept of "We Are All Africans"," The American Political Science Review 57, no. 1 
(1963): 88; E. Green, "Explaining African Ethnic Diversity," International Political Science Review 34, no. 3 
(2013). 
34 See: A. H. Kydd, "Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation," American Journal of Political 
Science 47, no. 4 (2003); I. Svensson, "Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace," 
Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 2 (2007). 
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Mediation by the UN and Major Powers 
The ineffectiveness of the UN when it comes to mediation has been highlighted 
frequently in previous studies. For instance, Touval has argued that the UN lacks the 
economic and military resources to successfully mediate.35 However, the UN 
commands greater resources than any organisation in Africa.36 Moreover, there are 
few states or organisations that have a greater capacity to deploy a peacekeeping force 
than the UN. Accordingly, the ineffectiveness of the UN is best explained through its 
lack of legitimacy as a result of the African solutions norm, as well as its relatively 
lack of financial and military resources compared to major powers. 
Indeed, several studies have shown that major powers are effective mediators. When 
explaining the effectiveness of these states, particularly of the US and the Soviet Union, 
observers usually point to their high degree of third party capacity. For example, Touval 
primarily refers to the “vast military and economic resources” of the superpowers.37 
According to Rothchild, successful conflict resolution becomes more likely when great 
powers press the disputants to reach a compromise.38 In line with the capacity-based 
mediation perspective, I argue that among the non-African third parties, the major powers are 
the most effective in mediating civil wars in Africa. In addition, I argue that while the UN is 
by an large infective at mediating civil wars in Africa, the ineffectiveness of non-African 
third parties is not solely driven by non-African third parties. The next section outlines the 
research methodology to examine test the central argument, as well as the alternative 
arguments. 
 
Methodology 
To statistically study the likelihood of the conclusion of peace agreements, this article draws 
on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).39 The unit of analysis in the 
dataset is conflict dyad-years. A conflict dyad consists of a government and an organized 
                                                 
35 For example, see: S. Touval, "Why the U.N. Fails: It Cannot Mediate," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 5 (1994). 
36 A. Layachi, "The Oau and Western Sahara: A Case Study," in The Organization of African Unity after Thirty 
Years, ed. Y. El-Ayouty (London: Praeger, 1994), 35. 
37 S. Touval, "The Superpowers as Mediators," in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to 
Conflict Management, ed. J. Bercovitch and J. Z. Rubin (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 232. 
38 Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, 250. 
39 L. Themnér and P. Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1946-2012," Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (2013). 
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rebel party. The use of conflict-dyad-years makes it possible to determine the different effects 
of African and non-African mediation efforts within mediation episodes that may take several 
years. 
These conflict data are supplemented with unique data on all mediation efforts in civil 
wars in Africa between 1960 and 2012. I use Bercovitch’s broad and frequently employed 
definition to code mediation efforts in conflict dyad-years identified by the UCDP. 
Bercovitch understands international mediation as a “process of conflict management, related 
to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, where the disputing parties or their 
representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help from an individual, group, state 
or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without 
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.”40 Accordingly, this definition 
differentiates mediation from other types of conflict resolution such as bilateral negotiations 
without the involvement of a third party, international arbitration, and coercive intervention. I 
translate Bercovitch’s definition into three coding criteria to identify mediation efforts in the 
dataset: (1) the activity undertaken by the third party should be specifically aimed at 
achieving a compromise or a settlement of issues between the adversaries; (2) the adversaries 
have to give their consent to the involvement of the third party; and (3) the adversaries have 
to give consent to the final outcome of the mediation process.41 
The dataset relies on several sources, including most frequently the UCDP Conflict 
Encyclopaedia’s category of third party involvement. This category also includes information 
on third party efforts like peacekeeping and humanitarian involvement, which are not coded 
as mediation since these type of third party activities are not aimed at resolving or regulating 
the conflict through negotiations. In addition, the data on mediation is drawn from news 
media, monographs, and journal articles. The online appendix of this article includes a 
codebook and comprehensive narratives of the conflict and mediation efforts, including all 
the relevant sources that have been used to compile the dataset. 
 The mediation efforts included in the dataset are all aimed at making peace between 
the primary conflict parties in civil wars. Conflict resolution workshops involving civil 
society representatives are thus excluded. While it is impossible to determine the exact level 
of inclusivity of the dataset, even instances of lesser-publicized mediations are included in the 
                                                 
40 J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," in Mediation in 
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, ed. J. Bercovitch and J. Z. Rubin 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 7. 
41 See: ibid. 
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dataset. Mediation efforts aimed at ending civil wars usually attract a lot of attention; yet 
even in those instances in which mediation was conducted secretly, the mediation effort is 
usually documented at a later point in time. For instance, the dataset records that Algeria 
mediated some secret meetings aimed at ending the civil war in Mali in 2012, in parallel to 
official peace process led by the AU. Other telling examples include the peacemaking efforts 
of Tiny Rowland in Mozambique and a secret mediation effort conducted by the Community 
of Sant’Egidio between the CNDD-FDD leadership and the Government of Burundi in Rome 
in September 1996. 
 In order to measure the types of mediation under study, four mutually exclusive 
dummy variables have been created: no mediation, African mediation, non-African 
mediation, and mixed mediation. No mediation indicates a conflict dyad-year in which no 
third party was involved in mediation. African mediation is measured by examining whether 
at least one African third party was involved in mediation in a given dyad-year, without the 
involvement of any non-African third parties. Non-African mediation is, conversely, defined 
as the involvement of at least one non-African third party in mediation without the 
involvement of African third parties. Finally, mixed mediation takes place when at least one 
African and one non-African third party were involved in the mediation. The focus is on the 
organizational identity of the mediator rather than the personal identity, meaning that when 
an African mediator is mandated by a non-African third party, as for example by the United 
Nations, the mediation effort is understood to be non-African. It is acknowledged that in 
some instances the personality of the mediator affects the prospects for success to a great 
extent, but the individual efforts of a mediator are connected to, and therefore greatly 
influenced by the standing, legitimacy, and leverage of the mandating agencies they 
represent.42 
 In order to assess the alternative explanations put forward in the theory section, I rely 
on several dummy variables.  I understand a state to be a major power if they are defined as 
such in the Correlates of War project.43 To code whether an African third party is biased, I 
follow Svensson’s operationalization by looking at whether a given third party has previously 
provide external support to one of the conflict parties.44 Culture is inherently difficult to 
                                                 
42 M. Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 40, no. 2 (1996). 
43 This means that the US, France, the UK, the Soviet Union, and China are listed as the major powers during 
the Cold War period. Russia replaces the Soviet Union and Germany and Japan are added to the list from 1991 
onwards. See: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/SystemMembership/2008/System2008.html.  
44 Svensson, "Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace." 
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define, let alone measure in a statistical analysis, but an approximation is put forward by 
Inman et al., who operationalise culture by measuring religion, ethnicity, and language.45 The 
shared culture dummy variable used in the empirical analysis is coded as 1 if the chief 
mediator shares the same religion, ethnicity, and language with at least one of the conflict 
parties. 
Mediation success is assessed in terms of the conclusion of peace agreements. The 
conclusion of a peace agreement is measured as a dichotomous variable. I draw on the UCDP 
to code whether a peace agreement has been concluded in a given dyad-year.46 In order to be 
included in the dataset, a peace agreement should address the incompatible goals of the 
conflict parties by settling all or part of the conflict issues. A document that solely stipulates 
the implementation of a ceasefire is thus not considered to be a peace agreement.  
Although this study assumes that mediation is a general phenomenon with many 
similarities from setting to setting, it is acknowledged that there are always contextual 
circumstances specific to any individual effort. In order to control for the factors that 
influence both the likelihood of mediation and the prospects for mediation success, several 
contextual factors are included in the analysis. First of all, I include a dummy variable taken 
from the UCDP that measures whether the conflict is fought over a piece of territory, because 
previous research shows that these type of conflicts are harder to resolve.47 Since previous 
research shows that civil war episodes in which many battle-related deaths occur are less 
likely to be resolved, the models also include a dummy variable that measures the intensity of 
the conflict.   Conflict intensity is measured by coding conflict dyad years in which more than 
1,000 battle-related deaths are recorded as 1.48 In order to control for the impact of the 
duration of the conflict, a variable is include that measures the number of years. A squared 
version of conflict duration is also included to control for curvilinear effects.49 Since previous 
research has found that peace agreements are more likely to be concluded in conflicts with 
stronger rebel parties, a variable is included that measures the strength of the rebel movement 
                                                 
45 M. Inman et al., "Cultural Influences on Mediation in International Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 
(2013). 
46 S. Högbladh, "Peace Agreements 1975-2011:  Updating the Ucdp Peace Agreement Dataset," in States in 
Armed Conflict 2011, ed. T. Pettersson and L. Themnér (Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, 2012). 
47 M. D. Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory  
(Princeton Princeton University Press, 2003). 
48 T. D. Mason and P. J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 40, no. 4 (1996). 
49 Ibid. 
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in comparison to the government.50 Finally, I also include a control variable in the models 
that is coded as 1 when the conflict parties receive financial support, military equipment, or 
are allowed to use safe havens in another country.51 
In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity in the explanatory variables, the dummy 
variable measuring no mediation is excluded from the analyses in each of the models. No 
mediation thus serves as the reference category by which the coefficients of the different 
mediation types are interpreted. This means that if a variable measuring mediation has a 
statistically insignificant effect, then this type of mediation is not statistically significant more 
or less likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement that when no mediation takes 
place in a given conflict dyad-year. 
Finally, the data used in this study entail observations on the same unit of analysis 
over a series of time points, which may bias the findings as a result of temporal dependence. 
Following Beck et al., I use binary time-series cross-section correction to account for this 
potential bias.52 Accordingly, all models are run using cubic splines. A variable that measures 
the time since a value of 1 was observed for the dependent variable in the regression is also 
included in all models.  
 
Findings 
Africa has experienced 938 conflict dyad-years between 1960 and 2012. Of this total of 938 
conflict dyad-years, 334 have experienced mediation. This constitutes almost 36 percent of 
the total number of conflict dyad-years, from which it follows that international mediation is 
a standard approach to end armed violence in Africa. 
African third parties have been involved in mediation in 241 conflict dyad-years in 
Africa between 1960 and 2012. In 129 of these conflict-dyad-years, African third-parties 
were involved in mediation simultaneously or jointly with non-African third-parties. This 
means that African-third parties have been involved in mediation without the involvement of 
any non-African third-party in 112 conflict-dyad-years. Non-African third-parties have 
mediated in 222 conflict dyad-years, but non-African mediation without the involvement of 
                                                 
50 G. Clayton, "Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Civil War Mediation," Journal of Peace 
Research 50, no. 5 (2013). 
51 T. Pettersson, "Pillars of Strength: External Support to Warring Parties," in States in Armed Conflict 2010, 
Research Report No. 94, ed. T. Pettersson and L. Themnér (Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet, 2011). 
52 N. Beck, J. N. Katz, and R. Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a 
Binary Dependent Variable," American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998). 
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African third-parties has taken place in only 93 conflict dyad-years. Mixed mediation is thus 
the most common type of mediation in civil wars in Africa, followed by African mediation, 
and non-African mediation respectively.  
 It follows from Figure 1 below that mixed mediation has become increasingly 
common in relation to mediation efforts conducted solely by African or non-African third 
parties. During the Cold War, between 1960 and 1989, both coordinated and uncoordinated 
mediation were far less common than African and non-African mediation. Yet, between 1990 
and 1999, coordinated mixed mediation was as common as African mediation and only 
slightly less common than non-African mediation.53 In the period from 2000 onwards, 
coordinated mixed mediation has been the most common type of mediation. 
 
<< Insert figure 1 here >> 
 
Moreover, Figure 2 shows the number of mediation dyad-years as a percentage of the 
total number of conflict dyad-years in a given conflict. The graph clearly shows that 
mediation has increased in importance as a conflict management tool. 
 
<< Insert figure 2 here >> 
 
 Figure 3 shows in how many conflict dyad-years a given African third party has been 
involved. The OAU and its successor the AU have been involved in 101 conflict dyad-years. 
Of all sub-regional African organisations, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) has mediated in most conflict dyad-years. The top three of African states most 
involved in mediation in Africa includes Kenya, South Africa, and Ethiopia, 
 
<< Insert figure 3 here >> 
 
                                                 
53 The prevalence of non-African mediation in the 1990s reflects the efforts non-African third parties to resolve 
civil wars following the end of the Cold War, as for example in Angola or Mozambique. 
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Figure 4 shows in how many conflict dyad-years a given non-African third party has 
been involved. Of all third parties involved in mediation in civil wars in Africa, the UN has 
mediated in most conflict dyad-years, namely 127 conflict dyad-years. After the UN, the 
Community of Sant’Egidio is the non-African organization that has mediated most often in 
Africa. The top three of non-African states involved in mediation in Africa includes the US, 
France, and the UK.  
 
<< Insert figure 4 here >> 
 
In the 1960-2012 period, 127 peace agreements were concluded in Africa. Out of 
these agreements, 17 were concluded without third party involvement. A further 49 were 
concluded with only African third parties involved in the dyad-year, only six with solely non-
African third parties involved in the dyad-year, and 55 were concluded with a combination of 
African and non-African third parties involved in the dyad-year. Table 1 shows how effective 
third parties are in reaching peace agreements. The significant values of the likelihood ratio 
chi-square tests suggest that all models included in Table 1 have a good fit. 
 
<< Insert table 1 here >> 
 
Model 1 in Table 1 shows the results for the comparison between the effectiveness of 
the different types of third parties. All three types of mediation have a positive impact, 
though the effect of non-African mediation is statistically insignificant. Since the reference 
category is conflict dyad-years with no mediation, it follows from Model 1 in Table 1 that 
dyad-years in which African and mixed mediation take place are significantly more likely to 
experience the conclusion of a peace agreement. By contrast, conflict dyad-years in which 
non-African mediation takes place are not statistically significant more or less likely to lead 
to the conclusion of a peace agreement than dyad-year in which no mediation takes place. 
The difference between the coefficients of each type of mediation reported in Model 1 
in Table 1 are substantial. Based on the logit estimates of Model 1 in Table 1, Table 2 shows 
that when all variables are held at mean value, the probability of the conflict parties 
concluding a peace agreement in a given conflict-dyad-year is only 2.0 percent. All else 
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equal, the probability of the conclusion of a peace agreement increases by 1356 percent when 
an African third-party is involved in mediation. For non-African mediation this probability 
increases by only 100 percent and for mixed mediation this is 1138 percent. Hence, African 
mediation is much more likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement than non-
African mediation.  
 
<< Insert table 2 here >> 
 
As a robustness test, the observations in Model 2 in Table 1 are restricted to conflict 
dyad-years which experienced mediation. When restricting the observations to this sub-set of 
cases, the finding that African and mixed mediation efforts are more effective than non-
African mediation efforts still holds.  
Model 3 includes a dummy variable that measures whether the chief mediator shares a 
similar culture with one or both of the conflict parties. A chief mediator that shares a similar 
ethnicity, religion, and language with at least one of the conflict parties is relatively rare. 
Only 8.9 percent of all African mediation efforts were conducted by a chief mediator that 
shared a similar culture with at least one of the conflict parties. This figure is 7.8 percent for 
mixed mediation and 3.2 percent for non-African mediation. Hence, African mediation is 
indeed more likely to be conducted by a chief mediator that shares a similar culture with at 
least one of the conflict parties. However, it follows from Model that the effectiveness of 
African and mixed mediation remain when controlling for the impact of a chief mediator that 
shares a similar culture with one of the conflict parties. There are indeed many examples of 
mediation efforts in civil wars in Africa where culture did not seem to play any role. For 
instance, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie mediated between the Government of Sudan and 
the Southern based rebel movement Anya Nya in 1972. Selassie shared his Christian faith 
with most of the Anya Nya fighters, though he belonged to the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Tewahedo. Yet, Selassie’s native language was Amharic and he did not share the same 
ethnicity with the conflict parties either. In spite of the cultural difference, Selassie 
successfully mediated the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. What Selassie did have in 
common with both of the conflict parties, however, was a strong commitment to pan-
Africanism. 
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Model 4 includes a control variable that is coded as 1 if a biased African third party is 
involved in mediation in a given conflict dyad-year. Model 4 thus shows that the involvement 
of a biased African third party in a given conflict dyad-year has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on mediation success; yet, crucially, the negative effect of African biased 
mediation does no wipe out the positive impact of African mediation. The dataset includes 49 
conflict dyad-years in which biased African mediation has taken place. There is a wealth of 
anecdotal evidence that is in line with the finding that the involvement of a biased African 
third party has a negative impact on mediation success. For instance, the involvement of 
ECOWAS in the second civil war in Liberia from 1999 to 2003 alternated between 
mediation, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping. The involvement in peace enforcement 
efforts, which directly targeted Charles Taylor’s forces, undermined ECOWAS’ neutrality.54 
According to Anthony Nyakyi, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General to Liberia, this lack of neutrality was the main obstacle to peace, as it made Charles 
Taylor hesitant to become involved in peace talks led by ECOWAS.55  
In line with the capacity-based perspective of mediation success, Model 5 in Table 1 
shows that major power mediation is a type of non-African mediation that has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a peace agreement is concluded. 
Mediation by the UN has a negative impact, but this effect is insignificant. The mediation 
efforts of the Soviet Union and the US in the civil war between the Government of Angola 
and UNITA illustrate how the economic and military power of superpowers can lead to the 
conclusion of peace agreements. The MPLA government had paid for the Soviet Union’s 
military support by oil and diamonds revenues, but Angola still had a total external debt of 
close to $9 billion by 1991, of which 65 percent owed to the Soviet Union.56 This gave the 
Soviet Union leverage over the MPLA government. The UNITA leadership was also 
provided with incentives to comply with the mediator, particularly through the involvement 
of the US, which was the main provider of military support to UNITA. Commenting on the 
conclusion of the Bicesse Accords, UNITA leader Savimbi expressed that without the 
Americans and the Soviets the mediation process would not have gotten anywhere.57 
                                                 
54 L. Nathan, "‘When Push Comes to Shove: The Failure of International Mediation in African Civil Wars," 
Track Two 8, no. 2 (1999): 4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 C. Pycroft, "Angola: ’the Forgotten Tragedy‘," Journal of Southern African Studies 20, no. 2 (1994): 248. 
57 D. Rothchild and C. Hartzell, "Great- and Medium-Power Mediations: Angola," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 518(1991): 56. 
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It follows from Table 1 that just like African mediation, mixed mediation also 
significantly increase the prospect for conflict resolution. Table 3 therefore further explores 
the positive impact of mixed mediation. Previous research has found that mixed peacemaking 
efforts can be frustrated if there is a lack of coordination.58 Table 3 further explores the 
positive impact of mixed mediation by comparing coordinated and uncoordinated efforts. The 
uncoordinated mixed mediation category includes both competing efforts undertaken 
simultaneously and uncoordinated separate mediation efforts that are conducted sequentially 
over time in the same conflict dyad-year. 
 
<< Insert table 3 here >> 
 
A further distinction is made between coordinated mixed mediation led by an African 
third party and those that are led by a non-African third party. Although several third parties 
can be involved in a mediation process, there is usually one third party that takes the lead. 
Often this is the country or organization to which the chief mediator belongs. Those 
coordinated mixed mediation efforts which were conducted jointly are also considered. The 
mediation in Darfur conducted by Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and his AU counterpart Salim 
Ahmed Salim in 2007 and 2008 serves as an example of a joint mediation effort. 
It follows from Table 3 that uncoordinated mediation has a negative, though 
statistically insignificant, impact on mediation success. Since conflict dyad-years in which no 
mediation takes place is the reference category of the mediation types under study, it follows 
from Table 3 that a peace agreement is not statistically significant more or less likely to be 
concluded in a conflict dyad-year in which uncoordinated mixed mediation takes place than 
in a conflict dyad-year in which no mediation takes place. By contrast, if coordinated 
mediation takes place in a given conflict-dyad year, the conclusion of a peace agreement is 
much more likely than if no mediation would take place in this dyad-year. The lack of 
coordination between Portugal, France, and ECOWAS in their peacemaking efforts in the 
civil war in Guinea-Bissau between 1998 and 1999 illustrate how competing interests can 
undermine the potential effectiveness of mixed mediation.59 The mediation effort conducted 
                                                 
58 C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall, "A Crowded Stage: Liabilities and Benefits of Multiparty 
Mediation," International Studies Perspectives 2, no. 1 (2001). 
59 S. Massey, "Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War," South African Journal of Military 
Studies 32, no. 1 (2004). 
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by the Community of Sant’Egidio between the CNDD-FDD leadership and the Government 
of Burundi in Rome in September 1996 serves as another example of uncoordinated mixed 
mediation. The negotiations mediated by the Community of Sant’Egidio were not intended to 
complement the regional initiative, rather to substitute it.60 
By contrast, all three types of coordinated mediation have a positive and significant 
effect. Yet, Table 4 below shows that coordinated mixed mediation that is led by an African 
third party is by far the most effective, making the conclusion of a peace agreement 1766 
percent more likely than when no mediation takes place. The finding that African led mixed 
mediation has been found to be the most effective type of mediation resonates with the peace 
and security polices developed as part of the partnership for peace.61 
 
<< Insert table 4 here >> 
 
The final phase of the Abuja peace process, which was aimed at ending the civil war 
in Darfur, illustrates that non-African third parties taking over the mediation process can 
supplant the positive impact of African mediation. While the AU mediators had made some 
progress towards resolving the underlying conflict issues, an externally imposed deadline and 
an intrusive mediation strategy pursued by the US terminated the peace process prematurely. 
Instead of building on the work already done by the AU, the US and the UK relied on a 
strategy based on coercion and inducements to move the conflict parties towards 
compromise. Hence, the final days of the Abuja talks to end the war in Darfur show the 
importance that African third parties maintain the lead when mediating civil wars in Africa.  
 
Conclusion 
The statistical analyses suggest that African third parties outperform non-African third parties 
in terms of concluding peace agreements. In 2011, the AU Commission Chairperson Jean 
Ping pointed out that: “Lasting peace on the continent can only be achieved if efforts to that 
                                                 
60 M. O. Maundi, "Preventing Conflict Escalation in Burundi," in From Promise to Practice: Strengthening Un 
Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, ed. C. L. Sriram and K. Wermester (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), 339-40. 
61 See: Dersso, "The Quest for Pax Africana: The Case of the African Union's Peace and Security Regime; P. D. 
Williams and A. Boutellis, "Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations–
African Union Relationship," African Affairs 113, no. 451 (2014). 
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end are based on the full involvement of Africa and a recognition of its leadership role 
because, as stressed by the Summit in August 2009, without such a role, there will be no 
ownership and sustainability; because we understand the problems far better; because we 
know which solutions will work, and because, fundamentally, these problems are ours, and 
our peoples will live with their consequences.”62 The statistical analyses employed in this 
article supports this statement. African third parties are generally more effective in resolving 
civil wars in Africa than non-African third parties. 
However, a major caveat regarding the finding that African third parties outperform 
non-African third parties is that that the involvement of a biased African third party in 
mediation processes has a negative and statistically significant effect on mediation success. 
Since conflicts in Africa have strong regional dimensions, African states have frequently 
openly supported incumbent governments or have provided covert support to rebel parties 
prior or simultaneously to their mediation attempt. The statistical analysis employed in this 
article suggests that the involvement of biased African third parties that are supporting or 
have supported one of the conflict parties undermines the prospects for mediation success.  
In terms of theory development, the findings in this article suggest that ideational 
factors influence the effectiveness of a third party. A capacity-based perspective of mediation 
success cannot adequately explain why African third parties, which often face resource 
constraints, are more effective in mediating civil wars in Africa than non-African third 
parties. Future research should be devoted to examining why and how third party legitimacy 
matters. 
Finally, while mediation by African third parties is more effective than non-African 
mediation, most effective are mixed mediation efforts in which African and non-African third 
parties mediate jointly. Particularly effective are mixed mediation efforts in which there is 
coordination between African and non-African third parties, but in which African third 
parties take the lead. The phrase, ‘African solutions to African challenges’ should be 
understood as a division of labour and responsibilities, rather than an excuse for non-African 
third parties to ignore Africa’s problems or African third parties acting on their own. Indeed, 
while African third parties should take the lead in mediation processes in African armed 
conflicts, non-African third parties should support these processes by lending additional 
strength. Through supplementing each other’s comparative advantages legitimacy-based and 
                                                 
62 Ping quoted in: Dersso, "The Quest for Pax Africana: The Case of the African Union's Peace and Security 
Regime," 44. 
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capacity-based mediation respectively, African and non-African third parties can more 
effectively resolve civil wars in Africa. 
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